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  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-id journal-id-type="nlm-ta">Arq Bras Cardiol</journal-id>
      <journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">abc</journal-id>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title>Arquivos Brasileiros de Cardiologia</journal-title>
        <abbrev-journal-title abbrev-type="publisher">Arq. Bras. Cardiol.</abbrev-journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
      <issn pub-type="ppub">0066-782X</issn>
      <issn pub-type="epub">1678-4170</issn>
      <publisher>
        <publisher-name>Sociedade Brasileira de Cardiologia - SBC</publisher-name>
      </publisher>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id" specific-use="scielo-v3">St9Pn6XqWBF4FFTFxNzsNDS</article-id>
      <article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id" specific-use="scielo-v2">S0066-782X2019000600727</article-id>
      <article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.5935/abc.20190100</article-id>
      <article-categories>
        <subj-group subj-group-type="heading">
          <subject>Short Editorial</subject>
        </subj-group>
      </article-categories>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Rational Use of Evidence-Based Medicine: Why We Resist So Much?</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <name>
            <surname>Schmidt</surname>
            <given-names>Andr&#233;</given-names>
          </name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
          <xref ref-type="corresp" rid="c1"/>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">0000-0001-5242-329X</contrib-id>
          <name>
            <surname>Pazin-Filho</surname>
            <given-names>Antonio</given-names>
          </name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">2</xref>
        </contrib>
      </contrib-group>
      <aff id="aff1">
        <label>1</label>
        <institution content-type="orgname">Universidade de S&#227;o Paulo</institution>
        <institution content-type="orgdiv1">Faculdade de Medicina de Ribeir&#227;o Preto</institution>
        <institution content-type="orgdiv2">Disciplina de Cardiologia</institution>
        <addr-line>
          <city>Ribeir&#227;o Preto</city>
          <state>SP</state>
        </addr-line>
        <country country="BR">Brazil</country>
        <institution content-type="original">Faculdade de Medicina de Ribeir&#227;o Preto - USP - Disciplina de Cardiologia - Departamento de Cl&#237;nica M&#233;dica, Ribeir&#227;o Preto, SP - Brazil</institution>
      </aff>
      <aff id="aff2">
        <label>2</label>
        <institution content-type="orgname">Universidade de S&#227;o Paulo</institution>
        <institution content-type="orgdiv1">Faculdade de Medicina de Ribeir&#227;o Preto</institution>
        <institution content-type="orgdiv2">Disciplina de Emerg&#234;ncias Cl&#237;nicas</institution>
        <addr-line>
          <city>Ribeir&#227;o Preto</city>
          <state>SP</state>
        </addr-line>
        <country country="BR">Brazil</country>
        <institution content-type="original">Faculdade de Medicina de Ribeir&#227;o Preto - USP - Disciplina de Emerg&#234;ncias Cl&#237;nicas - Departamento de Cl&#237;nica M&#233;dica, Ribeir&#227;o Preto, SP - Brazil</institution>
      </aff>
      <author-notes>
        <corresp id="c1"><bold>Correspond&#234;ncia: Andr&#233; Schmidt,</bold> Divis&#227;o de Cardiologia - HCFMRP-USP - AV. Bandeirantes, 3900. Postal Code 14048-900, Ribeir&#227;o Preto, SP - Brazil. E-mail: <email>aschmidt@fmrp.usp.br</email>
				</corresp>
      </author-notes>
      <pub-date date-type="pub" publication-format="electronic">
        <day>15</day>
        <month>07</month>
        <year>2019</year>
      </pub-date>
      <pub-date date-type="collection" publication-format="electronic">
        <month>06</month>
        <year>2019</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>112</volume>
      <issue>6</issue>
      <fpage>727</fpage>
      <lpage>728</lpage>
      <permissions>
        <license license-type="open-access" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xml:lang="en">
          <license-p>This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited</license-p>
        </license>
      </permissions>
      <kwd-group xml:lang="en">
        <title>Keywords</title>
        <kwd>Acute Coronary Syndrome</kwd>
        <kwd>Prognosis</kwd>
        <kwd>Myocardial Infarction</kwd>
        <kwd>Clinical Decision Making</kwd>
        <kwd>Health Knowledge, Attitudes Practice, Evidence-Based Medicine</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <p>
      <bold>&#8220;Man is a rational animal who always loses his temper when he is called upon to act in accordance with the dictates of reason&#8221;</bold>
    </p>
    <p>
      <bold>
        <italic>Oscar Wilde</italic>
      </bold>
    </p>
    <p>Patients expect three things during a medical consultation: To know what they have, how they should be treated and what is the prognosis of the illness. For all these relevant questions physicians apply their clinical judgement. This term, as vague as it sounds, has been largely utilized and research has recently been developed to clarify its meaning and intend to develop techniques to improve it. Many biases (actually more than thirty have been described) or non-rational decisions can occur during the entire decision-making process and were extensively studied in non-medical areas like economics, granting a Nobel Prize to Daniel Kahneman. Although commonly observed in diagnostic reasoning, the first question of the patient, it has also a significant role in therapeutic decisions, the second question and ultimately, both previous questions affect the third one.</p>
    <p>A therapeutic decision solely based on clinical judgement is certainly influenced by previous personal experiences and acquired knowledge, even if not recent or up to date. In most cases, those decisions must respect 3 fundamental principles of rational decision making - the principle of dominance, the principle of invariance and the sunk-cost principle of fallacy.<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B1">1</xref> Briefly, the first one states that a person should choose the option that is never worse than the others available and may provide a better outcome. The principle of invariance holds that same data-information should be considered and used the same way despite how it is presented. Finally, because decisions influence the future not the past, so those making decisions should not consider previous outcomes and behaviors - the sunk-cost principle/fallacy.</p>
    <p>Carvalhal et al.,<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B2">2</xref> in this issue of the Arquivos Brasileiros de Cardiologia, made an observational study in a coronary care unit where the GRACE score was applied to every admission. Contrary to the GRACE study they included only patients with an acute coronary syndrome without ST-segment elevation in their study cohort. They verified that despite the risk score category (low, intermediate or high), the therapeutic decision of intervention was made in equal proportions. Additionally, a propensity score based on physicians preferences was less prognostic than the GRACE score.</p>
    <p>So, why physicians choose not to use the GRACE score? The GRACE study from nearly 25 years ago, using a large sample of acute coronary syndrome patients from 94 representative hospitals in 14 countries, obtained data about all aspects involving the care of those patients and proposed some guidance to better select interventions<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B3">3</xref><sup>,</sup><xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B4">4</xref> based on prognostic factors identified. The proposed score has been validated in other cohorts.<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B5">5</xref><sup>,</sup><xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B6">6</xref>
		</p>
    <p>The three principles above mentioned were apparently not considered. Since the invasive option was selected equally for all risk score categories, the principle of dominance was ignored because non-invasive exams were the choice for those at least in those with a low-risk score. Also, the principle of invariance was not considered since similar risk scores (same information) were distinctly treated. The third principle, also known as a sunk-cost fallacy, was not observed since, despite knowledge of the validation of the GRACE score for predicting future events, it was not used, probably based on previous misleading information or personal experiences. In this situation, people tend to remember worse outcomes even if they are very few compared to those who evolved well. Here it may also apply other biases such as default bias and bandwagon effect.<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B1">1</xref> The propensity score used in the study was less predictive of mortality than the GRACE score. It would be interesting to know if based on these results any change in the decision process was done.</p>
    <p>Some aspects were not addressed by the authors. Bias due to race, gender and economic status may be present in some settings.<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B7">7</xref> They did not specify if the sample was exclusively from the public health system or private. This information may have also an influence in the decision process (availability bias) since some exams may not be available in the public health care system, for example.</p>
    <p>To reduce bias, the simplest approach is to have doctors aware of the various biases present in daily practice. Another very important solution for bias and heuristics behavior is adherence to Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM). It provides accurate information from multiple sources and suggests those more validated and identify those considered harmful.<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B8">8</xref> The GRACE score is an excellent example of EBM. Nowadays, another relevant area for research in this field is the prescription of the new oral anticoagulants.<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B9">9</xref> As in Oscar Wilde quote, we must resist being non-rational and follow straight and balanced guidelines in order to improve our results in daily practice.</p>
  </body>
  <back>
    <fn-group>
      <fn fn-type="other">
        <p>Short Editorial related to the article: Behavioral Influence of Known Prognostic Markers on the Cardiologist&#8217;s Decision following Acute Coronary Syndrome: the GRACE Score Paradox</p>
      </fn>
    </fn-group>
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  </back>
  <sub-article article-type="translation" id="s1" xml:lang="pt">
    <front-stub>
      <article-categories>
        <subj-group subj-group-type="heading">
          <subject>Minieditorial</subject>
        </subj-group>
      </article-categories>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Uso Racional da Medicina Baseada em Evid&#234;ncias: Por Que Resistimos Tanto?</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <name>
            <surname>Schmidt</surname>
            <given-names>Andr&#233;</given-names>
          </name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff3">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">0000-0001-5242-329X</contrib-id>
          <name>
            <surname>Pazin-Filho</surname>
            <given-names>Antonio</given-names>
          </name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff4">2</xref>
        </contrib>
      </contrib-group>
      <aff id="aff3">
        <label>1</label>
        <institution content-type="original">Faculdade de Medicina de Ribeir&#227;o Preto - USP - Disciplina de Cardiologia - Departamento de Cl&#237;nica M&#233;dica, Ribeir&#227;o Preto, SP - Brasil</institution>
      </aff>
      <aff id="aff4">
        <label>2</label>
        <institution content-type="original">Faculdade de Medicina de Ribeir&#227;o Preto - USP - Disciplina de Emerg&#234;ncias Cl&#237;nicas - Departamento de Cl&#237;nica M&#233;dica, Ribeir&#227;o Preto, SP - Brasil</institution>
      </aff>
      <author-notes>
        <corresp id="c2"><bold>Correspond&#234;ncia: Andr&#233; Schmidt,</bold> Divis&#227;o de Cardiologia - HCFMRP-USP - AV. Bandeirantes, 3900. CEP 14048-900, Ribeir&#227;o Preto, SP - Brasil. E-mail: <email>aschmidt@fmrp.usp.br</email>
				</corresp>
      </author-notes>
      <kwd-group xml:lang="pt">
        <title>Palavras-chave</title>
        <kwd>S&#237;ndrome Coronariana Aguda</kwd>
        <kwd>Progn&#243;stico</kwd>
        <kwd>Infarto do Mioc&#225;rdio</kwd>
        <kwd>Tomada de Decis&#227;o</kwd>
        <kwd>Conhecimentos</kwd>
        <kwd>Atitudes e Pr&#225;tica em Sa&#250;de</kwd>
        <kwd>Medicina Baseada em Evid&#234;ncias</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </front-stub>
    <body>
      <p>
        <bold>&#8220;O homem &#233; um animal racional que sempre perde a raz&#227;o quando o chamam a agir racionalmente&#8221;</bold>
      </p>
      <p>
        <bold>
          <italic>Oscar Wilde</italic>
        </bold>
      </p>
      <p>Os pacientes esperam tr&#234;s coisas durante uma consulta m&#233;dica: saber o que eles t&#234;m, como ser&#225; o tratamento, e qual o progn&#243;stico da doen&#231;a. Para todas essas perguntas relevantes, os m&#233;dicos usam de seu julgamento cl&#237;nico. Esse termo, que soa t&#227;o vago, tem sido amplamente utilizado. Recentemente, pesquisas t&#234;m sido realizadas para esclarecer seu significado e desenvolver t&#233;cnicas para melhor&#225;-lo. Muitos vieses (mais de trinta j&#225; foram descritos) ou decis&#245;es n&#227;o racionais podem ocorrer durante o processo de tomada de decis&#227;o, e foram exaustivamente estudados em &#225;reas n&#227;o m&#233;dicas, tal como economia, que resultou no Pr&#234;mio Nobel para Daniel Kahneman. Apesar de comumente observado na racionalidade diagn&#243;stica, a primeira pergunta do paciente tamb&#233;m exerce um importante papel na tomada de decis&#245;es terap&#234;uticas, e tanto a primeira como a segunda pergunta afetam a terceira.</p>
      <p>Uma decis&#227;o terap&#234;utica baseada somente no julgamento cl&#237;nico &#233; certamente influenciada por experi&#234;ncias pessoais pr&#233;vias e conhecimento adquirido, mesmo que esse n&#227;o seja recente ou atualizado. Na maioria dos casos, essas decis&#245;es devem respeitar tr&#234;s princ&#237;pios fundamentais da tomada de decis&#227;o racional - o princ&#237;pio da domin&#226;ncia, o princ&#237;pio da invari&#226;ncia e o princ&#237;pio da fal&#225;cia do custo irrecuper&#225;vel (<italic>sunk-cost fallacy</italic>).<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B1">1</xref> Em resumo, o primeiro princ&#237;pio afirma que uma pessoa deve escolher a op&#231;&#227;o que nunca seja pior que as demais op&#231;&#245;es e que possa promover um melhor desfecho. O princ&#237;pio da invari&#226;ncia afirma que os mesmos dados/informa&#231;&#245;es deem ser utilizados da mesma maneira, independentemente de como se apresentem. Finalmente, uma vez que as decis&#245;es influenciam o futuro e n&#227;o o passado, os tomadores de decis&#245;es n&#227;o devem considerar resultados e comportamentos pr&#233;vios - princ&#237;pio ou fal&#225;cia do custo irrecuper&#225;vel.</p>
      <p>Nesta edi&#231;&#227;o dos Arquivos Brasileiros de Cardiologia, Carvalhal et al.,<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B2">2</xref> realizaram um estudo observacional em uma unidade coronariana, em que o escore GRACE foi aplicado em cada interna&#231;&#227;o. Ao contr&#225;rio do estudo GRACE, os autores inclu&#237;ram somente pacientes com s&#237;ndrome coronariana aguda sem eleva&#231;&#227;o do segmento ST em sua coorte. Eles observaram que, apesar da categoria do escore de risco (baixo, intermedi&#225;rio ou alto), a decis&#227;o terap&#234;utica da interven&#231;&#227;o foi feita em iguais propor&#231;&#245;es. Al&#233;m disso, o escore de propens&#227;o baseado nas prefer&#234;ncias dos m&#233;dicos teve menor valor progn&#243;stico que o escore GRACE.</p>
      <p> Assim, por que os m&#233;dicos optam por n&#227;o utilizar o escore GRACE? O estudo GRACE foi realizado h&#225; 25 anos, utilizando uma grande amostra de pacientes com s&#237;ndrome coronariana aguda de 94 hospitais de 14 pa&#237;ses, obteve dados de todos os aspectos que envolvessem o cuidado desses pacientes, e prop&#244;s algumas diretrizes para orientar a escolha de interven&#231;&#245;es<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B3">3</xref><sup>,</sup><xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B4">4</xref> com base nos fatores progn&#243;sticos identificados. O escore proposto foi validado em outras coortes.<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B5">5</xref><sup>,</sup><xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B6">6</xref>
			</p>
      <p>Os tr&#234;s princ&#237;pios citados acima aparentemente n&#227;o foram considerados. Uma vez que a alternativa invasiva foi escolhida igualmente para todas as categorias de escore de risco, o princ&#237;pio da domin&#226;ncia foi ignorado, uma vez que exames n&#227;o invasivos seriam a escolha para aqueles com um escore de risco baixo . Al&#233;m disso, o princ&#237;pio da invari&#226;ncia n&#227;o foi considerado, uma vez que escores de risco similares (isto &#233;, mesma informa&#231;&#227;o) foram tratados de maneira diferente. O terceiro princ&#237;pio, tamb&#233;m conhecido como a fal&#225;cia do custo irrecuper&#225;vel, n&#227;o foi observado, uma vez que, apesar de se conhecer a valida&#231;&#227;o do escore GRACE na predi&#231;&#227;o de eventos, o escore n&#227;o foi utilizado, provavelmente com base em informa&#231;&#245;es err&#244;neas pr&#233;vias ou experi&#234;ncias pessoais. Nesta situa&#231;&#227;o, as pessoas tendem a se lembrar dos piores desfechos, mesmo que esses tenham pouca semelhan&#231;a com aqueles que apresentaram boa evolu&#231;&#227;o. Aqui caberiam outros vieses, tais como o vi&#233;s do status quo (ou <italic>default bias</italic>) e o efeito de bandwagon.<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B1">1</xref> O escore de propens&#227;o usado no estudo foi menos preditivo de mortalidade que o escore GRACE. Seria interessante saber se, com base nesses resultados, foi feito qualquer mudan&#231;a no processo de decis&#227;o.</p>
      <p>Alguns aspectos n&#227;o foram considerados pelos autores. Vieses decorrentes de ra&#231;a, sexo e condi&#231;&#227;o econ&#244;mica podem estar presentes em alguns cen&#225;rios.<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B7">7</xref> Os autores n&#227;o especificaram se a amostra foi proveniente do sistema p&#250;blico e/ou privado de sa&#250;de. Tal informa&#231;&#227;o tamb&#233;m pode influenciar a tomada de decis&#227;o (vi&#233;s de disponibilidade), uma vez que alguns exames podem n&#227;o estar dispon&#237;veis no sistema p&#250;blico de sa&#250;de, por exemplo.</p>
      <p>Para reduzir a ocorr&#234;ncia de vieses, a estrat&#233;gia mais simples &#233; os m&#233;dicos conhecerem os v&#225;rios vieses poss&#237;veis na pr&#225;tica di&#225;ria. Outra solu&#231;&#227;o muito importante para evitar vieses e heur&#237;sticas &#233; a ades&#227;o &#224; medicina baseada em evid&#234;ncias (MBE). Ela oferece informa&#231;&#245;es precisas de v&#225;rias fontes, sugere as informa&#231;&#245;es mais validadas e identifica aquelas consideradas prejudiciais.<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B8">8</xref> O escore GRACE &#233; um excelente exemplo de MBE. Atualmente, outro importante ramo da pesquisa nesta &#225;rea &#233; a prescri&#231;&#227;o de novos anticoagulantes orais.<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="B9">9</xref> Como afirmou Oscar Wilde, devemos resistir &#224; irracionalidade e seguir diretrizes claras e equilibradas a fim de melhorarmos nossos resultados no dia a dia.</p>
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      <fn-group>
        <fn fn-type="other">
          <p>Minieditorial referente ao artigo: Influ&#234;ncia comportamental da predi&#231;&#227;o de risco no processo de decis&#227;o do cardiologista: o paradoxo do Escore GRACE</p>
        </fn>
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